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INTRODUCTION 
After the excitement of getting into the college of her choice wears off, a 
student may soon wonder how she will pay for her newfound prize. Though 
higher education is almost always a sound investment given its potentially 
tremendous return and importance in getting a good job, the cost is daunt­
ing-sometimes even prohibitive-for many students. Public undergraduate 
* 
Who is, no doubt, a disgruntled student paying out-of-state tuition in his third year of law 
school. In addition to various financial institutions, I am indebted to my editors, Mike Lechliter and 
Dana Kaersvang, for their valuable advice and insight. I also owe much to Alicia Frostick, Kamal 
Ghali, Chris Grostic, Christie Hammerle, and Tim Wyse, who make up the best Notes Office anyone 
could hope for. Their dedication and commitment to excellence is contagious. Most importantly, I 
must thank Janet Hsu for her love and support, and for always being-in the words of the Isley 
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and graduate schools are an attractive option for many students because of 
lower tuitions. Yet state universities deny many students the full measure of 
this benefit. 
Public universities usually charge significantly higher tuition rates to 
out-of-state students than in-state students. A nonresident student may find 
herself paying as much as three times what her resident counterparts pay.' 
Consequently, a student's classification as a resident or nonresident may 
determine whether she can afford higher education. State statutes and school 
regulations often require that students have resided in the state for at least a 
year before they can be classified as residents for tuition purposes.2 As a 
result, state colleges frequently deny many students the benefit of lower tui­
tion for at least a year, regardless of their intentions to make the state their 
permanent home. 
These sorts of waiting periods, which require that a person have resided 
in a state for a particular period of time before she is entitled to a benefit, are 
called durational-residence requirements.3 Durational-residence require­
ments raise a red flag for many constitutional law scholars because the 
Supreme Court has struck down many-though not all-of them. It is there­
fore unsurprising that many lawyers and scholars have argued that 
durational-residence requirements for in-state tuition are unconstitutional. 
Nevertheless, no court has found these requirements unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that durational-residence 
requirements implicate the fundamental right to travel.4 In Shapiro v. 
Thompson, the Court struck down one-year durational-residence require­
ments for welfare benefits in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Washington, 
D.C.5 The Court established a framework with which to evaluate durational-
I. For example, for the 2�5 school year, the University of Michigan's College of Lit­
erature, Science & the Arts charged lower-division tuition and fees of $8,201.38 per year for 
resident students and $26,027.38 per year for nonresident students. UNIV. OF M!CH.-ANN ARBOR, 
ACADEMIC YEAR TuITION AND FEES FOR FULL-TIME STUDENTS BY DEGREE LEVEL, ACADEMIC 
UNIT, AND RESIDENCY 1-2 (July 22, 2005), http://www.umich.edu/-oapainfoffABLES/PDF/ 
UMAA_TuitFee_History.pdf. For the same school year, the tuition and fees at the University of 
California at Berkeley were $6,729.90 per year for resident students and $23,685.90 for nonresident 
students. UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, 2�5 FEE SCHEDULE, http://registrar.berkeley.edu/ 
Registration/feesched0405.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2005). 
2. Examples of states that impose such requirements for in-state tuition at public colleges 
and universities include Arizona, AR1z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-1802 (2002), California, CAL. EDuc. 
CODE §§ 68017-18 (West 2001), Colorado, Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-7-102(5) (2004), New 
York, N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 302.l(a)(6) (2001), North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 116-143.l(b) (2003), and Texas, Tux. EDUC. CODE. ANN.§ 54.052 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004). 
3. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 832 (2d ed. 
2002). 
4. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). In United States v. Guest, 383 
U.S. 745 (1966), the Supreme Court first declared that there is a fundamental right to travel. Al­
though the Constitution does not expressly mention this right, the right to travel has been viewed as 
necessary to bind together the strong union of the United States. Id. at 758. The right to travel not 
only allows a person to travel for political purposes but ensures that a person can escape an undesir­
able majority and relocate to a community with which his values and views are more compatible. 
See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 178-79 (1980). 
5. 394 U.S. at 638. 
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residence requirements. First, after noting that there was weighty evidence 
that the statutes' purposes were to exclude the poor from the states,6 the 
Court held that the purpose of deterring the migration of the indigent into 
the state was constitutionality impermissible because it served to penalize 
those who exercised their fundamental right to travel. 7 Then, with respect to 
other justifications that the states advanced for the requirements, the Court 
held that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
classifications serving to penalize the exercise of the right to travel must 
survive strict scrutiny.
8 The Court concluded that the laws failed to meet that 
standard. 9 
In focusing on penalties upon the right to travel, Shapiro established a 
"severe-penalties " rule in analyzing durational-residence requirements.10 
Under this rule, state laws imposing severe burdens on interstate travel must 
survive strict scrutiny.11 Unfortunately, the Court did not elaborate on what 
constitutes a "penalty. " In what would be important for later cases, however, 
the Court did observe that the law created a classification denying a group 
the "ability ... to obtain the very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other 
necessities of life."12 
Perhaps recognizing the myriad durational-residence requirements in ex­
istence, the Court carefully qualified its holding. In what would haunt future 
judicial review of durational-residence requirements for in-state tuition, the 
Court stated in an infamous footnote that its holding implied "no view of the 
validity of waiting-period or residence requirements determining eligibility 
to vote, eligibility for tuition-free education, to obtain a license to practice a 
profession, to hunt or fish, and so forth."
13 
6. Id. at 628. 
7. Id. at 63 1 .  
8 .  See id. at 634. 
9. Id. at 638. The states advanced four justifications for the durational-residence require­
ments: facilitating budget predictability, providing administrative ease in detennining residence, 
preventing fraud, and encouraging new residents to joint the labor force promptly. Id. at 634-37. 
None survived scrutiny. The Court concluded that the justification of facilitating budget predictabil­
ity was unsupported by the record. Id. at 634-35. Further, given other facts available to welfare 
authorities, the durational-residence requirement was found to be unnecessary to the state's justifica­
tion of administrative efficiency in determining residency. Id. at 636. The means were also not 
narrowly tailored to the goal of preventing fraud. Id. at 637. Finally, the Court found that the state's 
justification of encouraging new residents to join the workforce had no rational relationship to the 
law. Id. at 637-38. 
10. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Poverty, Residency, and Federalism: States' Duty of Impartiality 
Toward Newcomers, 1 999 SUP. CT. REv. 277, 282 (discussing how Justice Marshall construed 
Shapiro as establishing a severe penalties approach in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 
U.S. 250 ( 1 974)). 
1 1 . See id. 
1 2. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627. 
13. Id. at 638 n.2 1 (second emphasis added). The Court has since chipped away at this quali­
fication. See infra notes 1 23-124 and accompanying text. 
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Later cases elaborated upon what constituted a penalty upon the exercise 
of the right to travel. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,14 the Court 
held as unconstitutional the denial of nonemergency medical care to indigent 
people who had resided in the county for less than one year. 15 Consistent 
with Shapiro, Maricopa County concluded that nonemergency medical care 
was at least as much of a basic necessity of life to an indigent person as wel­
fare benefits.16 The Supreme Court also used the Shapiro analysis to strike 
down a one-year durational-residence requirement for voting in Dunn v. 
Blumstein. 11 The Court applied strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause because the law penalized people who recently exercised their right 
to travel. 
18 
As a result, the Court revealed that "penalties" upon the right to 
travel include more than just denials of basic necessities of life; they also 
include denials of the "basic right to vote."19 In addition, Blumstein made 
clear that a durational-residence requirement can be unconstitutional even 
when it neither seeks to deter nor actually deters travei.
2 °  
The Court has, 
however, upheld durational-residence requirements for divorce petitions, 
although the Court's reasoning was highly dubious.2 1  
1 4. 4 1 5  U.S. 250 ( 1974). 
15 .  ld. at 269-70. 
1 6. Id. at 259. 
1 7. 405 U.S. 330 ( 1972). At issue was a Tennessee law authorizing voter registration only for 
those who had been residents of the state for a year and residents of their counties for three months. 
Id. at 331 .  Subsequently, the Court has allowed states to impose durational-residence requirements 
of up to fifty days in order to prepare adequate voting records and protect against fraud. See Marston 
v. Lewis, 4 1 0  U.S. 679, 680-81 ( 1973). 
1 8. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 338. Alternatively, the Court concluded that Equal Protection 
required strict scrutiny because the classification denied some residents the fundamental right to 
vote. Id. 
1 9. See id. at 342. The Court stressed that the law "force[d] a person who wishe[d] to travel 
and change residences to choose between travel and the basic right to vote." Id. 
20. See id. at 339-40 
2 1 .  See Sosna v. Iowa, 4 1 9  U.S. 393 (1975). A n  Iowa statute required that one have resided 
in the state for at least a year before she could file a petition for divorce. See id. at 395-96. Then­
Justice Rehnquist upheld the law and distinguished Shapiro, Blumstein, and Maricopa County on 
two grounds. First, he stated that in the prior cases, the states justified the durational-residence re­
quirements on the basis of budgetary or recordkeeping considerations. Id. at 406. In contrast, Justice 
Rehnquist found that the law in question could be justified on the grounds that ( 1 )  the state did not 
want to be a "divorce mill for unhappy spouses" and (2) the state wished to protect its divorce de­
crees from collateral attack. Id. at 406-08. Second, he stated that the prior cases irretrievably 
foreclosed new residents from obtaining some part of the benefits sought. Id. at 406. He concluded 
that the Iowa law, in contrast, merely delayed, rather than denied, new residents access to the courts; 
after the one-year waiting period, they could obtain a divorce. See id. Having concluded that the 
Iowa law was "of a different stripe" than those in Shapiro, Blumstein, and Maricopa County, Justice 
Rehnquist held that the durational-residence requirement was constitutional under an unstated -but 
most likely rational-basis-level of scrutiny under Equal Protection. See id. at 406-10. Justice Mar­
shall's dissent criticized the majority because the law in Maricopa County similarly denied indigents 
benefits for only a year. Id. at 422 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He also stressed that the state's denial 
of divorce to a new resident similarly served as a severe penalty upon the right to travel. Id. at 420 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall would have applied strict scrutiny and held the law un­
constitutional. Id. at 420, 427 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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In its most recent review of a durational-residence requirement in Saenz 
v. Roe,22 the Supreme Court threw many new surprises into the constitutional 
analysis of these laws. At issue was a California law that limited new resi­
dents, for the first year of their residence in the state, to the welfare benefits 
they would have received in their prior states of residence.23 Unlike Shapiro, 
the law did not completely deny a benefit; rather, it potentially reduced the 
benefits for one year. In its defense, California claimed that the law would 
save the state $10.9 million per year in welfare costs.24 California also ar­
gued that the law had no punitive effect because newly arrived welfare 
recipients received the same welfare benefits they would have in their previ­
ous states of residence; the law thus made them no worse off.25 The state 
was likely trying to avoid Shapiro's call for strict scrutiny when a law "pe­
nalizes " the exercise of the right to travel. 
An unconvinced Court struck down the law. The Court stated that the 
right to travel includes three components: (1) the right of a citizen of one 
state to enter and leave another state; (2) the right to be treated as a welcome 
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when one is temporarily in another 
state; and (3) the right for travelers who elect to become permanent resi­
dents of a state to be treated like other citizens of the state.26 The Court 
concluded that this case involved the third component, which it found rooted 
in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 As 
with Shapiro and its progeny, the Court applied strict scrutiny in striking 
down the California law. 28 The Court held that the law failed strict scrutiny 
22. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
23. Id. at 493. This requirement, however, could benefit only California. If a resident's prior 
state of residence offered more generous benefits than California, the resident's welfare benefits 
would be capped at California's maximum. Id. at 493 n. l (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE. ANN. 
§ 1 1450.03 (West Supp. 1999)). 
24. Id. at 497. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 500. 
27. Id. at 502--03. The Privileges or Immunities Clause reads, "No State shall make or en­
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
In addition to identifying three components of the right to travel for the first time, Saenz finally 
identified the textual source of the fundamental right to travel. Kathleen Winchell, Note, Disparate 
Treatment of Students in a Similar Class: The Constitutionality of Kentucky's Method of Determin­
ing Residency Status for Admission and Tuition Assessment Purposes, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 1037, I 050 
(2002). This identification was significant because in earlier opinions implicating the right to travel, 
the Court at times was arguably "smug in its refusal" to provide a source. ELY, supra note 4, at 1 77. 
28. The Court stated that 
[n]either mere rationality nor some intermediate standard of review should be used to judge the 
constitutionality of a state rule that discriminates against some of its citizens because they have 
been domiciled in the State for less than a year. The appropriate standard may be more cate­
gorical than that articulated in Shapiro, but it is surely no less strict. 
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). As a result, the Court appeared to apply 
at least strict scrutiny. Though it is unclear whether the Court intended to make durational-residence 
requirements unconstitutional per se, see infra Section 11.C, at least one commentator has argued 
that Saenz erected an insurmountable barrier to durational-residence requirements. See, e.g., Erika 
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because the state's justification of saving money had no relevance to the 
duration of the recipients' residence in California or their prior states of 
residence. 29 
Saenz's critical innovation was to broaden the analysis from Shapiro's se­
vere-penalties rule. Similar to its position in Blumstein concerning a 
durational-residence requirement's actual deterrence to travel, the Court re­
jected California's justification that the requirement only "incidentally" 
affected the right to travel.30 The Court then concluded that because a newly 
arrived citizen has a right to be treated equally in her state, a discriminatory 
classification itself serves as a penalty.31 Thus, the Court shifted the focus 
from severe penalties upon the exercise of the right to travel to discrimination 
against those who have exercised that right. 
Like the footnote in Shapiro, Saenz included language that would persuade 
other courts to limit its future applicability. The Court asserted that the welfare 
benefits in question could only be consumed while the recipient remained in 
California.32 The Court then established a "portability distinction" between 
welfare benefits and "readily portable benefit[s], such as divorce or a college 
education, that will be enjoyed after [citizens of other states] return to their 
original domicile."33 This language would later serve to thwart efforts in lower 
courts to strike down durational-residence requirements for in-state tuition. 
Both before and after the Saenz decision, challenges to durational­
residence requirements for in-state tuition at public colleges and universities 
were invariably unsuccessful. The Supreme Court has never conducted a sig­
nificant analysis of this issue. The Court has held that states may restrict 
tuition-free education to bona fide residents.34 Therefore, a fortiori, the Consti­
tution allows states to charge nonresidents higher tuition than bona fide 
residents. Furthermore, in dicta, the Court suggested in Vlandis v. Kline35 that 
as an element in determining bona fide residence for tuition purposes, states 
may impose a reasonable waiting period that can be met while the student is a 
student.36 
Despite this suggestion, the Supreme Court has never written an opinion 
on the constitutionality of durational-residence requirements for in-state tui­
tion. The Court has summarily affirmed two post-Shapiro district court 
K. Nelson, Comment, Unanswered Questions: The Implications of Saenz v. Roe for Durational 
Residency Requirements, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 1 93 ,  2 12- 1 3  (2000). 
29. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507. 
30. See id. at 504; cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 ( 1972). 
3 1 .  Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 ("But since the right to travel embraces the citizen's right to be 
treated equally in her new State of residence, the discriminatory classification is itself a penalty."). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. (emphasis added). 
34. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S 32 1 ,  330, 333 (1983). Bona fide residence requires both 
presence and an intention to remain in the state. Id. at 330. 
35. 412 U.S. 441 ( 1972). 
36. Id. at 452. In Wandis, the Court struck down under Due Process a Connecticut law that 
created a permanent, irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence for students who were not state residents 
at their times of application. See id. at 442-43, 452. 
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decisions, Starns v. Malkerson31 and Sturgis v. Washington,38 that hold that 
these requirements are constitutional.
3 9  
The Court issued no opinion in either 
case, leaving its thought processes a mystery. 
Several pre-Saenz state courts reviewed the constitutionality of these 
durational-residence requirements, and all upheld them under rational basis 
review.4 0  Kirk v. The Board of Regents of the University of California41-to 
which many later tuition cases cited4 2-relied on the footnote in Shapiro 
concerning tuition-free education to conclude that the Supreme Court must 
not have intended for Shapiro's standard of review to apply to such dur­
ational-residence requirements. 4 3  The Kirk court and others have frequently 
held that the following justifications were rationally related to the require­
ments: (1) achieving partial cost equalization and (2) providing the tuition 
reduction only for those who are prepared to make greater contributions to 
the state's economy and future.44 
The only case that has evaluated durational-residence requirements for 
in-state tuition in light of Saenz is the unpublished decision Markowitz v. 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 4s The court 
relied upon Kirk to uphold a California statute imposing a one-year 
37. 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970) (upholding a regulation promulgated by the University of 
Minnesota imposing a one-year durational-residence requirement for residency classification). 
38. 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 1973) (upholding a Washington-state statute imposing a one­
year durational-residence requirement for residence classification for tuition purposes at the University 
of Washington). 
39. See Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057 (1973), ajj"g 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash. 
1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (197 1 ), ajf'g 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1 970). 
40. See, e.g. , Eastman v. Univ. of Mich., 30 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 1 994 ); Kirk v. Bd. of Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1969) (construing the footnote in Shapiro as requir­
ing rational basis review); Gurfinkel v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 175 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 198 1 )  
(using largely the same reasoning a s  Kirk). The Arizona Supreme Court also upheld a n  Arizona 
Board of Regents rule imposing a one-year durational-residence requirement for in-state tuition. See 
Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Harper, 495 P.2d 453 (Ariz. 1972). The Arizona Supreme Court did not 
believe that the requirement would deter interstate travel and deferred to the precedent of Starns, 
Sturgis, and Kirk in declining to apply Shapiro. See id. at 455-57. Similar to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent in Saenz, the court concluded that the durational-residence requirement was the 
only tool available to the state in determining the residence status of a student. Id. at 457. 
41. 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1969). 
42. See, e.g. , Markowitz v. Univ. of Calif, No. A0961 82, 2002 WL 31428619, at *2-3 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2002); Gurfinkel, 1 75 Cal. Rptr. at 203--04. 
43. See Kirk, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 266 ("We do not think the addition of this footnote was an idle 
act to indicate the obvious fact that the opinion dealt merely with the questions presented. Rather, 
we read the footnote to mean that the court did not necessarily intend to apply the same standards to 
other residents [sic] requirements like the one here in question."). Then, the court distinguished 
Shapiro on largely the same grounds as Starns and Sturgis. See id. at 269. 
44. See, e.g., id. at 269. 
45. No. A096182, 2002 WL 31428619 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2002). Teitel v. University of 
Houston Board of Regents, 285 F. Supp. 2d 865 (S.D. Tex. 2002), and Ward v. Temple University, 
No. Civ.A. 02-7414, 2003 WL 2 1 281768 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2003), upheld one-year waiting periods 
but did not implicate the right to travel or even cite to Saenz. In Ward, the court simply concluded 
that residency status for tuition purposes was not a suspect classification and applied rational basis 
under Equal Protection. See Ward, 2003 WL 21281768, at *6. The author does not know why these 
courts did not even consider the ramifications of Saenz. 
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durational-residence requirement at state colleges.4 6  In a very brief 
discussion, the court held that Saenz did not compel heightened scrutiny for 
the benefits in question.4 7  The court seized upon Saenz's portability 
distinction, stating that Saenz "implicitly " concluded that portable benefits 
such as reduced college tuition are not among the privileges or immunities 
guaranteed by the Constitution.4 8 Once again, partial cost equalization 
served as a rational basis.49 
Despite that no challenge has succeeded, this Note contends that dur­
ational-residence requirements for in-state tuition at public colleges and 
universities do indeed violate the fundamental right to travel. Part I argues 
that Saenz's portability distinction is illusory and should not preclude the 
decision's reasoning from applying to requirements for college tuition. Part 
II then asserts that because Saenz has moved from a severe-penalties rule to 
a nondiscrimination rule, courts should apply strict scrutiny in evaluating 
durational-residence requirements for in-state tuition. Furthermore, this 
movement undoes the reasoning behind pre-Saenz precedent that declined to 
apply heightened scrutiny. Finally, Part III argues that these requirements 
should fail strict scrutiny because either the state interests are not compel­
ling or the means are not narrowly tailored to those interests. 
I. THE ILLUSION OF SAENZ'S PORTABILITY DISTINCTION 
Saenz's portability distinction should not prevent that decision from ap­
plying to durational-residence requirements for in-state tuition at public 
universities. Section I.A argues that the purpose of the portability distinction 
in Saenz is unclear, but is likely intended to show which types of durational­
residence requirements require strict scrutiny. Section l.B then argues that 
the distinction is illusory and should not prevent the application of Saenz's 
reasoning to in-state tuition durational-residence requirements. 
A. The Purpose of Portability 
Despite the importance that courts and commentators have placed on 
Saenz's portability distinction,5 0  the Court was not terribly clear as to what 
function portability played in its analysis. In light of precedent, however, the 
Supreme Court must have intended for a benefit's portability to determine 
whether a court should apply strict scrutiny. 
46. Markowitz, 2002 WL 31428619, at *3. 
47. Id. at *3. 
48. Id. at *4. The court further bolstered its argument by referring the language in Vlandis 
concerning durational-residence requirements for in-state tuition. Id. at *4. The court then con­
cluded that "Saenz and Vlandis did not alter well-established precedent upholding durational­
residency requirements for reduced tuition in public institutions of higher learning." Id. at *4. 
49. See id. 
50. See, e.g., Markowitz, 2002 WL 31428619, at *3-4; Lawrence J. Conlan, Note, Dur­
ational Residency Requirements for In-State Tuition: Searching for Access to Affordable Higher 
Leaming, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1404-07 (2002). 
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Through portability, the Court seemed to have attempted to distinguish 
precedent holding that durational-residence requirements for divorce and col­
lege tuition were constitutional under rational basis review.5 1  At least 
superficially, portability appears to form the dividing line between those 
cases that applied heightened scrutiny and those that did not. Welfare, 
52 
medical care,
53 and voting54 are perhaps nonportable in that once a recipient 
leaves the state, the immediate benefit is no longer available; education
55 and 
divorce5 6  benefit the recipient even after she has left the state. Thus, to a cer­
tain extent, the Court may have been trying to establish something 
analogous to a suspect class in equal protection analysis or a fundamental 
right in substantive due process analysis. The Markowitz court adopted this 
approach.
57 
At the same time, the Saenz Court could have meant that a benefit's 
portability creates a compelling state interest for states to deny certain bene­
fits to new residents, thereby allowing such durational-residence 
requirements to survive at least one prong of strict scrutiny review. This 
reading is consistent with Saenz's conclusion that with nonportable benefits, 
"there is no danger that recognition of their claim will encourage citizens of 
other States to establish residency for just long enough to acquire some 
readily portable benefit. "5 8  
In light of the Shapiro line of cases, however, the portability distinction 
serves a function more akin to a suspect class than a compelling state interest. 
Under Shapiro's severe-penalties rule, strict scrutiny applies to some dur­
ational-residence requirements but not to others.59 To be consistent with this 
precedent, the Court could very well have been trying to limit the application 
5 1 .  See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 ( 1999) ("Moreover, because whatever benefits they 
receive will be consumed while they remain in California, there is no danger that recognition of 
their claim will encourage citizens of other States to establish residency for just long enough to 
acquire some readily portable benefit, such as divorce or a college education, that will be enjoyed 
after they return to their original domicile."). 
52. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 6 1 8  ( 1969). 
53. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 ( 1974). 
54. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 ( 1972). 
55. Sturgis v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1057 ( 1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 405 U.S. 985 (1971). 
56. Sosna v. Iowa, 4 1 9  U.S. 393 (1975). 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49; Markowitz v. Univ. of Cal. ,  Hastings Coll. of 
the Law, No. A0961 82, 2002 WL 3 14286 19, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2002). The Alaska Su­
preme Court seemed to read Saenz this way as well, concluding that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause allowed states to impose durational-residence requirements on receiving a cash payment, a 
"readily portable benefit," from the state. See Schikora v. Alaska, 7 P.3d 938, 946 n.30 (Alaska 
2000). In so holding, the court did not consider at all the narrow tailoring required of strict scrutiny. 
See id. Consequently, the Schikora court most likely meant that rational-basis review would apply to 
such durational-residence requirements. 
58. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 ( 1999). It is also consistent with dicta in which the 
Court states that "[t]here may be substantial reason for requiring [a] nonresident to pay more than 
[a] resident . . . to enroll in [a] state university . . . . " Id. at 502. 
59. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 6 1 8, 634, 637 n.21 ( 1969). 
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of strict scrutiny to a narrow range of benefits.w The Court thus intended for 
portability to limit the cases where courts must apply strict scrutiny.61 
B. Portability as an Unprincipled Distinction 
Upon close inspection, the Court's effort to distinguish college tuition as 
a portable benefit proves to be more illusion than sound principle. The no­
tion that college tuition is portable is predicated on the idea that one could 
receive the benefit of education and still reap benefits from it after moving 
to another state.62 Consequently, the Court feared that eliminating dur­
ational-residence requirements for this class of benefits would encourage 
people to move to states only as long as necessary to obtain the desired 
benefit.63 To a great extent, however, welfare payments provide just as port­
able a benefit as college education. Section l.B.1 argues that the welfare 
benefits in Saenz were cash payments whose ultimate utility was as portable 
as a subsidy for higher education. Section I.B.2 then argues that the basic 
evil that the Court wanted to prevent is unrelated to portability. 
1. Welfare Benefits: Portable or Nonportable? 
Portability cannot distinguish welfare from tuition subsidies. Under a 
temporally limited view of welfare benefits-which in Saenz were cash 
payments64 -the benefit appears nonportable in the sense that the recipient 
will usually immediately spend the money and be unable to take it out of the 
state. This view, however, fails to recognize the ultimate utility of welfare. 
Critically, welfare is a portable investment in human capital, like a tuition 
subsidy; further, both can be similarly portable. As Chief Justice Rehnquist 
pointed out in his dissent to Saenz, the point of welfare is to give an indigent 
person much needed cash so that she can receive training, education, and 
time to look for ajob.65 Consequently, though the cash payment is consumed 
immediately in-state, the fruits of the benefit remain with the recipient and 
may benefit her wherever she goes.
66 Similarly, reduced in-state tuition is 
60. See, e.g., Mem'I Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415  U.S. 250, 256--57 ( 1974) (explaining 
that Shapiro looked to penalties upon the exercise of the fundamental right to travel and that the 
amount of impact required to give rise to strict scrutiny was unclear). 
6 1 .  Even if the portability distinction were to establish a compelling state interest and thus 
not limit Saenz 's call for strict scrutiny, durational-residence requirements for in-state tuition would 
still likely be unconstitutional because of a lack of narrow tailoring. This point will be discussed in 
infra Part ill. 
62. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505. 
63. See id. 
64. See id. at 520 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
65. See id. See generally Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 
9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & PoL'Y 89, 96--99 (2002); Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare: How the 
Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON 
HALL L. REv. 573, 58 1 (2004). 
66. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 5 1 9-20 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). 
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something that a student consumes while in-state, but the benefit of access 
to a college education will benefit her anywhere.67 
It is also important that the welfare benefits are cash payments. Intui­
tively, one would think that a cash payment is a portable benefit: one can 
save the money and spend it anywhere in the country, regardless of where 
she received it. At least one court has supported this seemingly self-evident 
notion that a cash payment is portable. In Schikora v. Alaska,68 the Alaska 
Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a state law that withheld 
annual Permanent Dividend Fund ("PDF") dividends from residents who 
had been absent from the state for more than 180 days that year.69 Impor­
tantly, the court characterized the cash payments of dividends as "the kind 
of 'readily portable benefits' " for which Saenz permits durational-residence 
• 70 requirements. 
There is no principled reason for classifying a PDF dividend as portable 
and a cash payment of welfare as nonportable. Most likely, the Supreme 
Court characterized the welfare benefits in Saenz as nonportable because of 
the intended recipients: the poor. The indigent recipients would probably 
spend the cash payments immediately rather than save them for use later or 
elsewhere.71 It is certainly unlikely that a welfare recipient would be capable 
of hoarding her cash welfare payments. In contrast, the recipient of an Alas­
kan PDF dividend might be able to save her cash payments. Because an 
Alaska state resident would qualify for PDF dividends by meeting only a 
very lenient set of requirements,72 recipients could include people from the 
entire socioeconomic spectrum, including those who could save the money 
for later consumption. 
Nonetheless, in classifying the PDF dividends as portable benefits, the 
Alaska Supreme Court did not at all seem concerned about where and when 
the money would be spent.73 There was no showing that the majority of PDF 
dividend recipients would save the money. Moreover, it is certainly possible 
that for many on the margins of society in Alaska, the dividend was a critical 
67. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). 
68. 7 P.3d 938 (Alaska 2000). 
69. Id. at 939. Alaska developed a Permanent Fund into which the state deposited at least 
25% of its mineral income each year. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 57 ( 1982). The Alaska legisla­
ture enacted the PDF to distribute annually portions of the Fund's earnings to the state's residents. 
Id. at 57. 
70. Id. at 946 n.30 (citing Saenz, 526 U.S. at 5�5). 
7 1 .  See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 ("[W]hatever benefits they receive will be consumed while 
they remain in California . . . .  ") . 
72. The requirements include ( 1 )  applying to the Department of Revenue; (2) being a state 
resident on the date of application; (3) being a state resident for at least the calendar year immedi­
ately preceding January 1 of the current dividend year; ( 4) being physically present in the state at 
some time during the prior two calendar years before the current dividend year; and (5) being a 
United States citizen or a qualifying alien. Schikora, 7 P.3d at 941 ;  see also ALASKA STAT. 
§ 43.23.00S(a) (1997). Interestingly, the third requirement appears to be a durational-residence 
requirement imposing a waiting period of up to one year for new Alaska residents, which could raise 
other constitutional issues. See id. This issue was not before the court. 
73. See Schikora, 7 P.3d at 946 n.30 (discussing PDFs only as cash payments). 
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cash infusion that would be spent immediately on basic necessities of life, 
just like welfare. Furthermore, the PDF program seemed to contemplate that 
the funds would, more likely than not, be spent in Alaska; the statute strictly 
required that the recipient could not be absent from the state for more than 
180 days, notwithstanding business or vacation.74 As a result, both the PDF 
dividends in Schikora and the welfare benefits in Saenz could be viewed as 
cash payments consumed while the resident is in the state. Paradoxically, the 
courts arrived at different conclusions as to whether the benefits were port­
able. 
Focusing on where and when the recipient will spend the money also 
masks the fact that the cash is most importantly a means to an end. The end 
itself can be equally portable in both cases. Assuming that the recipient of 
the cash does not give it away, she will eventually spend it on something, 
such as food, an education, or a car. Since it is what one gets from spending 
the money that is of true value to the recipient, it seems that the focus 
should be on that end, rather than the means to that end. If one focuses on 
the end-what a person can buy with the money-the portability distinction 
is untenable: some things that a person buys will be portable; some will not. 
Of particular relevance to welfare payments, a welfare recipient's expendi­
tures can be an investment in one's own employability, which is just as 
portable as a PDF recipient's expenditure on a car or computer.75 The Alaska 
Supreme Court thus unwittingly revealed the illusion of Saenz's portability 
distinction. When one looks at the ultimate utility of these benefits, there 
appears to be no material difference between the welfare payments and the 
PDF dividends. As a result, Saenz's portability distinction cannot stand to 
limit the decision's reach. 
The similarity between cash welfare payments and tuition reductions in 
terms of portability further compels Saenz's application to the latter. Tuition 
reductions essentially give money to those who qualify for them. 76 Like a 
cash payment, more affordable education is a means to an end, such as at­
taining marketable skills that will lead a well-paying job. This end is 
portable. Consequently, in terms of portability, there is little difference be­
tween welfare benefits and a reduction in tuition for state residents. 
2. Portability's Irrelevance to the Evil Saenz Sought to Prevent 
In trying to prevent benefit seekers from harming the states to which 
they flock, the Court fashioned a portability distinction that nonetheless was 
irrelevant to that harm. The Court specifically viewed this harm as encom­
passing people corning to a state only to avail themselves of attractive 
74. See id. at 939-40. 
75. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
76. See id. at 5 1 8  (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The welfare payment here and in-state 
tuition rates are cash subsidies provided to a limited class of people . . . .  "); Sturgis v. Washington, 
368 F. Supp. 38, 44 (W.D. Wash. 1973) (East, J., dissenting) (stating that the difference between in­
state and out-of-state tuition is equivalent to a subsidy granted to the in-state student). 
December 2005] The Toll for Traveling Students 585 
"portable" benefits, then leaving shortly thereafter because they could reap 
the rewards of the benefits elsewhere.77 States would be inundated by benefit 
seekers who would soon leave the state after obtaining the costly benefits 
that brought them in the first place, thus depriving the state of contributions 
from the recipient before and after the conferral.78 
Critically, portability is of little importance even when one considers the 
potential harm from the influx of welfare hunters. Even assuming that port­
ability constitutes a workable distinction, this distinction is irrelevant; 
whether a benefit is portable may not change a new resident's incentive to 
leave a state shortly after arriving. This seemed to be the case with the wel­
fare benefits in question in Saenz. California residents could receive welfare 
benefits for no longer than five years.79 A person who came to California 
only to obtain its more generous welfare benefits would have no incentive to 
remain after the state has cut her off from those benefits.80 Those who have 
the means to leave--certainly a possibility considering that they had the 
ability to come to the state in the first place--can leave. Moreover, if the 
recipient were able to reach self-sufficiency at or before the end of the wel­
fare period, she could leave the state before making any significant 
contributions to the local economy. Even worse, those who have neither 
reached self-sufficiency nor have the ability to leave present another prob­
lem: they will remain in the state without contributing to the economy, but 
may still avail themselves of other valuable state benefits.81 
Students may present less potential harm to states than welfare recipi­
ents. A similar flight risk is present with in-state tuition seekers: there is a 
risk that an out-of-state student will remain in the state only for the four 
years in which she obtains her undergraduate education. Concededly, it is 
more plausible that students have the ability to leave the state. Unlike wel­
fare recipients, however, it is less likely that the state will have to deal with 
people who must remain even after availing themselves of the state benefits 
77. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505. This concern was also evident at Saenz's oral argument. 
During a discussion over whether all waiting periods were penalties, one justice said, "[T]hey could 
have said that not all waiting periods are penalties simply because some of them may be made to 
assure that . . .  a person coming into the State genuinely wishes to become a resident. " Transcript of 
Oral Argument at *10, Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 ( 1999) (No. 98-97), 1999 WL 22762. 
78. The harm to the state could be articulated as allowing one state to free ride off the tax 
efforts of another state. See Hills, supra note 10, at 297. Additionally, the state may lose the benefit 
of the opportunistic recipient's future contributions to the state economy through a longer stay in the 
state. See Kirk v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (Ct. App. 1 969). 
79. Hills, supra note 10,  at 296. The counsel for the state of California also admitted to this 
fact at Saenz's oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at *23. Under federal 
law, the welfare recipient also would not qualify for welfare in any other state. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) 
(2000). Although this nationally uniform restriction may reduce flight risk to some extent, it could 
also increase the likelihood that one would come to California only for welfare benefits. With only a 
short window in which to obtain benefits, a welfare seeker might want to obtain his benefits exclu­
sively in a "generous " state like California. 
80. See Hills, supra note 1 0, at 297. 
8 1 .  For example, they may take advantage of public education for their children and emer­
gency and nonemergency medical care. 
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but cannot contribute to the state economy. 82 Consequently, portability has 
little connection to the harm to states in the case of both welfare and tuition. 
For these reasons, Markowitz should not have distinguished Saenz on the 
basis of the "portability" of the in-state tuition in question.83 A court should 
therefore look to Saenz's reasoning to determine if it should apply strict 
scrutiny to a waiting period for in-state tuition. 
II. SAENZ's IMPLICATIONS FOR DURATIONAL-RESIDENCE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR IN-STATE TuITION 
Saenz significantly expanded the analysis of durational-residence re­
quirements by adopting a nondiscrimination rule over the severe-penalties 
rule espoused in Shapiro.84 Saenz stated that California's durational­
residence requirement implicated the third component of the right to travel: 
the right of a newly arrived citizen to the same privileges or immunities en­
joyed by other citizens of the state.85 Because a new resident is entitled 
under the right to travel to be treated equally in her state of residence, a dis­
criminatory classification alone constitutes a penalty. 86 As a result, Saenz 
avoided the ambiguity of the severe-penalties rule that prior cases encoun­
tered. 87 This Part argues that Saenz renders prior cases declining to review 
in-state tuition durational-residence requirements under strict scrutiny un­
founded. Section II.A argues that in light of Saenz's shift to a 
nondiscrimination rule, courts should apply strict scrutiny to durational­
residence requirements for in-state tuition regardless of their effects on in­
terstate migration. Section II.B then argues that the degree to which students 
are penalized for traveling to the new state is irrelevant in determining 
whether strict scrutiny should apply. Section II.C asserts that these dur­
ational-residence requirements should be reviewed under strict scrutiny even 
though in-state tuition is not a basic necessity of life. Finally, Section II.D 
contends that strict scrutiny applies despite the Supreme Court's affirma­
tions of Starns and Sturgis. 
82. Some research shows that states gain more in future tax revenue from out-of-state students 
than in-state students. See generally Jeffrey A. Groen & Michelle J. White, In-State Versus Out-Of-State 
Students: The Divergence of Interest Between Public Universities and State Governments (Nat'! Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9603, 2003). The study by Groen and White concludes that (I} 
regardless of whether a student is from in-state or out-of-state, attending a university increases the 
probability that she will remain in that state to the same degree; and (2) out-of-state students make 
25% more in future tax payments than their in-state counterparts. See id. at 1 4-23. Consequently, 
states may not be harmed when they eliminate durational-residence requirements for in-state tuition 
and attract more out-of-state students. 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49. 
84. See Hills, supra note 10, at 282. 
85. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1 999). 
86. Id. at 505. 
87. Justice Marshall noted this ambiguity, eventually concluding that "[w]hatever the ulti­
mate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis, it is at least clear that medical care is as much 'a 
basic necessity of life' to an indigent as welfare assistance." Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415  
U.S. 250, 258-59 (1974) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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A. Blindness to Effects on Interstate Travel 
Much case law declining to apply strict scrutiny to durational-residence 
requirements for in-state tuition did so because the courts did not think that 
the waiting periods chilled or deterred migration into the state. 88 That could 
certainly be the case; in many states, a newly arrived student knows that she 
will be entitled to reduced tuition after her first year of education, at least if 
she can establish her intent to remain in the state permanently.89 
In adopting its nondiscrimination rule, Saenz expressly rejected that de­
terrence or chilling of migration was necessary for strict scrutiny to apply.90 
The Court stated that it was not concerned solely with actual deterrence to 
interstate migration.91 To this extent, Saenz stated nothing new; the Shapiro 
line of cases was concerned with whether the law served to penalize the ex­
ercise of the right to travel rather than whether the state actually deterred 
travel.92 As a result, many pre-Saenz decisions in lower courts that declined 
to apply strict scrutiny because of a lack of deterrence to the migration are 
not only wrong in light of Saenz but are most likely wrong in light of the 
Shapiro line of cases, as well. 
B. From Penalties to Discrimination 
In light of Saenz, the degree to which a new resident is penalized is no 
longer critical. The Shapiro severe-penalties rule, by definition, requires 
asking whether the denial of in-state tuition operates as a penalty upon the 
88. See, e.g., Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 40 (W.D. Wash. 1973); Starns v. Malk­
erson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 237-38 (D. Minn. 1970); Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Harper, 495 P.2d 453, 457 
(Ariz. 1 972); Kirk v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266--67 (Ct. App. 1969). 
89. For example, in Arizona, a student may be eligible for in-state tuition if she has resided in 
the state for at least one year, even if some of that time was spent in school, so long as she can show 
intent to make Arizona her permanent home. See ARlz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-1802 (2002); ARlz. Bo. 
OF REGENTS, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR ESTABLISHING RESIDENCY (May 2003), 
http://www.abor.asu.edu/l_the_regents/reports_factbook/residency.html#Establish%20Arizona%20resi 
dency (last visited Jan. 24, 2005). Other examples include: Colorado, see CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 23-7-102(5), 23-7-103(2)(c) (2004); OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR, UNIV. OF COLO. AT BOULDER, 
Qualified Person, TumoN CLASSIFICATION REGULATIONS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO 
AT BOULDER (Oct. 19, 2005), http://registrar.colorado.edu/students/tuition_classification_regula­
tions.html#qualifiedperson; New York, see N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 302. l (a)(6) (2001); 
STUD. RESPONSE CTR., STATE UNIV. OF N.Y., NEW YORK STATE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
TumoN PuRPOsES (Jan. 27, 2005), http://src.buffalo.edu/studentaccount/residency.shtml; and North 
Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 1 6-143 . l (b) (2002); OFFICE OF THE UNIV. REGISTRAR, UNIV. OF 
N.C., RESIDENCY REFERENCE (May 1 1 ,  2005), http://regweb.oit.unc.edu/residency/ncres.php. 
During the Saenz oral argument, one justice asked, "Then what good does the 1 -year residency 
assure? What good does that do . . .  if it simply requires the college freshman to stay there until he's 
a sophomore?" Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at *39. The counsel for Roe essentially 
responded not by addressing the deterrence aspect, but rather by asserting that the state had an inter­
est in ensuring that the student-part of a suspicious, transient class-was a bona fide resident. See 
id. at *39-*40. 
90. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505; see also Hills, supra note 10, at 282. 
9 1 .  See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505. 
92. See, e.g., Maricopa County, 415 U.S. at 258. 
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exercise of the right to travel.93 Arguably, the penalty upon a student is not 
very significant because she is not completely foreclosed from obtaining 
higher education in her new state of residence; she could still attend a public 
university in that state, though at a higher tuition rate for a set period of 
time. Moreover, out-of-state tuition for some students may not be much 
worse than their other realistic options. For example, a smart, aspiring engi­
neer from New York might have to pay higher out-of-state tuition at the 
University of California at Berkeley, but that could still be less expensive 
than her alternatives of Stanford and M.I.T.94 This student would not be ter­
ribly penalized by attending Berkeley. 
Saenz renders this inquiry irrelevant. The Court rejected California's de­
fense that the welfare recipients were no worse off than they were in their 
previous states because their welfare benefits would be the same.95 Further­
more, like differences in tuition between residents and nonresidents, Saenz 
did not involve an outright denial of the benefit, but rather a reduction in 
what was available to new residents compared with what was available to 
longer-term residents. Because the focus is now on whether there is dis­
crimination between new and old residents, it seems that a state's denial of 
in-state tuition to those who have resided in the state for less than a requisite 
period of time is sufficient discrimination to infringe upon the right to 
travel.96 The concept of penalty thus drops out of the picture; disparate 
treatment is the triggering condition.97 
As a result, courts should not consider whether a durational-residence 
requirement for in-state tuition serves as a penalty upon the newly arrived 
students. As with the welfare benefits in Saenz, states imposing such re­
quirements create discriminatory classifications between bona fide residents 
based upon how long they have resided in the state.98 It is immaterial how 
93. Shapiro, for example, seemed to leave this an open question in its famous footnote 
twenty-one. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,  638 n.21 (1969). 
94. On the other hand, the cost difference may be substantial for a needy student choosing 
between a public university in her own state and a public university in another state. The penalty 
may be all the worse if the out-of-state school provided unique opportunities not available in her 
own state, such as a leading volcanology program in Hawaii. 
95. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 496. Note that this defense was probably not entirely accurate. 
The cost of living in California is higher than most other states, so a new resident whose welfare 
benefits are pegged at those of her previous state would be worse off and consequently penalized in 
tenns of buying power. See Hills, supra note IO, at 282. At oral argument, the Court seemed to 
recognize this cost of living disparity, see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at *18,  but 
did not address it in the opinion. Because the Court held that the discrimination alone constituted a 
penalty, it does not appear that the cost-of-living adjustment made any difference in the Court's 
opinion. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505. 
96. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505. 
97. The notion that disparate treatment between newly arrived residents and long-tenn resi­
dents should trigger heightened scrutiny is not new. In his dissent to Sturgis, Judge East, who 
believed a durational residence requirement for in-state tuition failed strict scrutiny, wrote that the 
"freedom to travel . . .  embraces the fundamental right of an individual to . . .  receive equal treat­
ment under the laws of a given state." Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 43 (W.D. Wash. 1 973) 
(East, J., dissenting). 
98. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505. 
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burdened the newly arrived resident is by the denial. As the Court in Saenz 
wrote, a court should review under strict scrutiny "a state rule that discrimi­
nates against some of its citizens because they have been domiciled in the 
State for less than" a requisite period of time.99 
C. Applying Saenz Beyond the Basic Necessities of Life 
One might question whether Saenz requires that a court apply strict scru­
tiny to any durational-residence requirement, regardless of what benefit is at 
issue. Because Saenz involved welfare, which the Supreme Court has 
viewed as implicating the basic necessities of life,100 perhaps the decision's 
nondiscrimination rule only applies to similar types of benefits. This narrow 
application would leave undisturbed several pre-Saenz tuition cases declin­
ing to apply strict scrutiny because higher education is not a basic necessity 
Of life. IOI 
Despite that Saenz involved welfare, its nondiscrimination rule extends 
beyond the basic necessities of life to important benefits like in-state tuition 
for higher education. Section 11.C . 1  argues that although it is unclear if 
Saenz requires that all durational-residence requirements survive strict scru­
tiny, pre-Saenz precedent can shed light on the minimum extent to which the 
nondiscrimination rule should apply. Section 11.C.2 then argues that pre­
Saenz precedent shows that in-state tuition for higher education is important 
enough of a benefit to merit strict scrutiny under Saenz's rule. 
1 .  How Far Does Saenz Go? 
Only by looking to pre-Saenz cases applying strict scrutiny can one pre­
dict the minimum range of cases in which Saenz's nondiscrimination rule 
applies. The exact boundaries of the rule remain unclear. Arguably, this non­
discrimination rule could be completely indifferent to the type of 
discrimination at issue. In finding authority in the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, the Court spoke only of equality of treatment between new and old 
residents without qualification. 102 On the other hand, Saenz still involved what 
the Supreme Court has consistently considered a basic necessity of life. 103 Be­
cause Saenz dealt with welfare like Shapiro and did not disapprove of the 
tuition cases like Starns and Sturgis or the divorce case Sosna v. Iowa, perhaps 
its rule should be confined within the narrow context of basic necessities of 
99. Id. at 504. 
100. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 ( 1974). 
1 0 1 .  See, e.g., Sturgis, 368 F. Supp. 3 8  (W.D. Wash. 1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 
234 (D. Minn. 1970); Kirk v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1969). 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29. 
103. Arguably, Saenz did not involve the basic necessities of life because the welfare recipi­
ents in question were not denied welfare altogether, but rather were denied the incremental 
difference between the benefits offered in California and the benefits offered in their previous states 
of residence. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493. Consequently, unlike an outright denial as in Shapiro, the 
recipients might still have sufficient welfare support to obtain the basic necessities of life. 
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life and fundamental rights. 104 A corollary of this reading is that the Court 
did not intend for Saenz to apply to all disparate treatment of newly arrived 
residents. ws This reading is most consistent with precedent upholding some 
durational-residence requirements. 106 It also could explain the Court's illu­
sory portability distinction. 
Despite this uncertainty, pre-Saenz precedent provides guidance as to the 
types of benefits whose denial merits strict scrutiny under the nondiscrimi­
nation rule. By concluding that the disparate treatment at issue itself­
without regard to the degree of penalization-constituted a significant 
enough penalty to warrant strict scrutiny, w7 Saenz sought to extend the pro­
tection of the right to travel beyond what the Shapiro line of cases provided 
for. Because it expanded the right's range of protection, the nondiscrimina­
tion rule should at least cover the types of benefits meriting strict scrutiny 
under the severe-penalties rule. Furthermore, for equality of treatment to be 
meaningful, this level of scrutiny must extend to other types of benefits that 
are as important to residents as those protected under pre-Saenz precedent. 
If a state is to treat new residents like all other residents, it must at least treat 
them equally in the most important respects. 
2. Denial of Tuition Subsidies as Worthy of Strict Scrutiny 
Assuming that Saenz should not stand for the proposition that strict scru­
tiny applies to all disparate treatment between bona fide residents based 
upon length of residence, pre-Saenz precedent seems to show that Saenz 
should apply to important benefits like reduced tuition for higher education. 
Courts have long held that they will sometimes review durational­
residence requirements under strict scrutiny even when the denied benefit or 
right is not essential to one's survival. For example, the Supreme Court held 
in Blumstein that durational-residence requirements implicating important 
rights such as the right to vote must satisfy strict scrutiny.108 In a somewhat 
similar context, one district court has suggested that heightened scrutiny 
may be appropriate for evaluating durational-residence requirements for 
running for public office. Callaway v. Samson109 reviewed the constitutional­
ity of a New Jersey law requiring that a candidate for local office have 
104. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 28, at 2 1 8-19 (arguing that Saenz cannot apply so broadly 
that it would completely overhaul durational-residence requirement case history). The Court may 
also have been reluctant to overrule Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), because of its reluctance to 
involve itself in the area of family law-an arena governed by state law. See Katharine B .  Silbaugh, 
Miller v. Albright: Problems ofConstitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1 139, 1 1 39-40 
(1999). 
105. In contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist feared that Saenz would prevent states from impos­
ing durational-residence requirements in almost any case. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 5 15 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
106. See, e. g., Sosna, 419 U.S. 393 ( 1975). 
107. See supra Section II.B. 
108. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 ( 1 972). 
109. 193 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D.N.J. 2002). 
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resided in the "local unit" for which he sought office for at least a year prior 
to the date on which the election for office was to be held. 1 10 The court ulti­
mately struck down the law as violating the fundamental right to intrastate 
travel under the Due Process Clause. 1 1 1  Nevertheless, the court stated in 
dicta that if the plaintiff had come from another state, he would have had a 
"plausible argument" that the durational-residence requirement was an un­
due burden on his right to travel under Saenz.112 Consequently, the right to 
travel at least protects against states denying some things that are important 
to its newly arrived citizens. 
Of course, because these decisions involve voting and elections, they do 
not necessarily imply that the right covers college tuition. A durational­
residence requirement for voting involves a fundamental right, 1 1 3 whereas a 
durational-residence requirement for in-state tuition involves a benefit to 
which one has no fundamental right. 1 1 4  Similarly, the Callaway court charac­
terized eligibility for public office as "one of the highest honors and 
privileges of our democratic system."1 15 It also stressed that the law could 
exclude candidates from running for open seats or seats with vulnerable in­
cumbents. 1 16 As a result, Callaway's dicta may have been heavily driven by 
the court's fear of the law 's effects on our democratic system rather than its 
effects on new residents. 
Nevertheless, other decisions by the Supreme Court show that the right 
to travel extends to important benefits that are neither fundamental rights 
nor important to maintaining democracy. In Attorney General of New York v. 
Soto-Lopez, 1 17 the Court struck down a New York law that gave a one-time 
preference for civil service jobs to veterans who, amoni other things, were 
New York residents when they entered military service. 1 1  The plurality opin­
ion held that denial of the benefit of a preference for a civil service job 
constituted denial of "a significant benefit . . . [that] may not rise to the 
same level of importance as the necessities of life and the right to vote, [but 
is] unquestionably substantial" in that it could be a determinative factor in 
whether the applicant obtained the civil service job. 1 19 By denying this bene­
fit to those who were not New York residents at the time they entered 
service, the state penalized the exercise of the right to travel; therefore, the 
1 10. Id. at 785. 
1 1 1 . See id. at 786, 789. 
1 12. Id. at 786. 
1 13. See Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 ( 1972). 
1 14. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4 1 1  U.S. I, 35 ( 1973). 
1 15. Callaway, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 787. 
1 16. Id. 
1 1 7. 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
I I 8. Id. at 900--0 I. The preference amounted to an addition of points to a job applicant's 
examination score (amounting to two-and-one-half to ten additional points, depending upon the 
examination and whether the veteran had been disabled during war). Id. at 900 & n. l .  
I 19. Id. at 908. 
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court subjected the law to strict scrutiny. 120 Granted, the law in Soto-Lopez 
did not involve a classical durational-residence requirement, where one must 
be a bona fide resident of the state for a requisite period before she qualifies 
for a particular benefit. Rather, it involved fixed, permanent distinctions be­
tween classes of bona fide residents. 121 New York's durational-residence 
requirement is nonetheless similar to classical durational-residence require­
ments in that they both distinguish between bona fide residents based upon 
when they became state residents. 122 Consequently, Soto-Lopez shows that 
the right to travel may be infringed when a durational-residence requirement 
places a bona fide resident at a disadvantage in obtaining a particular job. 123 
Also in the context of employment, several lower courts have struck 
down durational-residence requirements for taking a state's bar exam. Un­
fortunately, these decisions conflict as to what level of scrutiny applies. 
Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners124 concluded that strict scrutiny applies 
because the eligibility requirement penalized the exercise of the right to 
travel. 125 The court took advantage of Chief Justice Warren's dissent in 
Shapiro, which noted the implications of the decision to "eligibility . . .  to 
engage in certain professions or occupations or to attend a state-supported 
university."126 Although a newly arrived, aspiring attorney likely had other 
areas of employment available to her, the court concluded she could none­
theless be deterred from migrating to the state both because of a loss in 
earnings and a loss of "true personal fulfillment . . .  in the active practice of 
the profession to which [she] has dedicated [herself]."121 On the other hand, 
two other decisions struck down similar bar exam requirements but declined 
to apply heightened scrutiny. Smith v. Davis128 held simply that the require­
ments had no rational basis under the Due Process or Equal Protection 
clauses to an applicant's fitness or competency to practice law. 129 Lipman v. 
1 20. Id. at 909. 
1 2 1 .  Id. at 908. 
1 22. Though in the case of Soto-Lopez, that point in time is measured by when that person 
entered military service and in the case of a typical durational-residence requirement, that point is 
measured by how long ago the person migrated to the state, there is still a resulting classification 
between bona fide residents. Cf Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 623 ( 1985) 
("[T]he Constitution will not tolerate a state benefit program that 'creates fixed, permanent distinc­
tions . . .  between . .. classes of concededly bona fide residents, based on how long they have been 
in the State.' " (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 59 ( 1 982)) (omissions in original)). 
1 23 .  Interestingly, Soto-Lopez somewhat chipped away at Shapiro's infamous footnote 2 1  
which, among other things, stated that durational-residence requirements might be permitted for 
licenses to practice a profession. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 6 1 8, 638 n.21 ( 1969). 
1 24. 3 1 7  F. Supp. 1 350 (E.D.N.C. 1970). 
1 25.  Id. at 1 362. Keenan thus chipped even further away at Shapiro's dicta in footnote 2 1 .  See 
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 n.2; supra note 1 23 .  
1 26. See Keenan, 3 17 F. Supp. a t  1 361  n.1 5 (quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 655 (Warren, CJ., 
dissenting). 
1 27. Keenan, 3 1 7  F. Supp. at 1 362. 
1 28. 350 F. Supp. 1 225 (S.D.W.V. 1 972). 
1 29. Id. at 1 229. 
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Van Zant
130 held that the requirement failed to have a rational basis under 
Equal Protection. 1 31 In a brief paragraph, the court simply referred to 
Shapiro's silence as to whether durational-residence requirements for li­
censes to practice a profession were constitutional. 132 
Given the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Soto-Lopez, Keenan 
seems to have reached the proper conclusion in applying strict scrutiny. 
Soto-Lopez involved only an advantage in obtaining a job, whereas the bar 
exam requirements involved the ability to practice law. Denial of bar admis­
sion to a lawyer is at least as much of a denial of a significant benefit as the 
additional test points at issue in Soto-Lopez. Further, from the perspective of 
deterring interstate travel, the certain inability to practice in one's career of 
choice would be even more preclusive that the possible failure of obtaining a 
civil service job. 
In light of Soto-Lopez and Keenan, heightened scrutiny seems appropri­
ate when new residents face a more significant hurdle in obtaining 
employment than longer-term residents. This hurdle need not be permanent 
or make the employment at issue unobtainable. Although Keenan involved 
complete exclusion from the practice of law,133 Soto-Lopez proposes that a 
complete denial is unnecessary to trigger heightened scrutiny because the 
applicants in that case were still eligible for civil service jobs, though they 
d
. 
d 134 were at a isa vantage. 
One should not synthesize these cases to show that strict scrutiny is suit­
able only for durational-residence requirements involving (1) permanent, 
partial denials of benefits or (2) temporary, complete denials of benefits. 
First, Saenz shows that the denial of a benefit need not be complete to im­
plicate the right to travel. 135 Second, whether one evaluates the requirement 
under the severe-penalties or nondiscrimination rule, a denial's effect upon a 
new resident does not tum upon whether the denial is complete or partial, 
but rather what has been denied. 136 In fact, a temporary, partial denial of an 
important benefit can be more onerous than a permanent, complete denial of 
a much less important benefit. 137 
1 30. 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1 97 1 ). 
1 3 1 .  See id. at 400-0 I .  
1 32. See id. at 401 & 401 n.28 (construing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 6 18, 638 n.2 1 
( 1969)). 
1 33. See Keenan v. Bd of Law Exam'rs, 317 F. Supp. 1 350, 1 362 (E.D.N.C. 1970). 
1 34. See Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 9 1 1  ( 1986). 
1 35. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504-05 ( 1999) (stating that the Court's decision does 
not tum upon the fact that there was only a partial withholding of benefits). 
1 36. It is semantic to argue whether a denial is complete or partial because any denial may be 
characterized as complete. For example, the durational-residence requirement in Saenz could be 
characterized as a complete denial of treatment as a long-term California welfare recipient. A far 
more probative inquiry is how the durational-residence requirement affects the new resident. 
137. For example, a temporary denial of the right to drive an automobile at night (but with no 
restrictions on driving during the day) is likely far more burdensome to most people than a perma­
nent denial of the right to operate a boat at any time. 
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Education is an especially important state service. Concededly, the Su­
preme Court has held that there is no fundamental right to education. 138 
Furthermore, lower courts have consistently refused to equate education 
with the basic necessities of life. 139 Courts have, however, recognized that 
education is a very important benefit. 14° Consequently, education is, at the 
very least, distinguishable from other types of benefits whose denial may 
seem more trivial, like obtaining a license to hunt or fish. 14 1 
The denial of in-state tuition is a significant hurdle to obtaining this im­
portant service. As in Soto-Lopez, the state does not deny a new resident 
higher education, but rather places her at a disadvantage in obtaining it 
compared to longer-term residents. Moreover, this difference, at least for 
less affluent students, can determine whether higher education in that state 
is financially feasible. 142 Higher education is also at least as important an 
opportunity as the civil service job at issue in Soto-Lopez. The Supreme 
Court considered the employment at issue important because of "its atten­
dant job security, decent pay, and good benefits."143 A college or graduate 
education can provide similar advantages. 144 
The foregoing decisions show that Saenz's nondiscrimination rule ap­
plies, at a minimum, where important, but not necessarily fundamental or 
vital, benefits are concerned. Higher education appears to belong to this 
class of benefits. Accordingly, because durational-residence requirements 
for in-state tuition result in disparate treatment, a court should review such 
requirements under strict scrutiny. 
138. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4 1 1  U.S. I, 35 (1973). 
139. See Lister v. Hoover, 706 F.2d 796, 798 (7th Cir. 1983) (Swygert, J., dissenting); Starns 
v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1 970); Markowitz v. Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of 
the Law, No. A096182, 2002 WL 3 1428619, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2002); Gurfinkel v. L.A. 
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 1 75 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204 (Ct. App. 1981); Kirk v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal., 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266 (Ct. App. 1 969). 
140. Perhaps the most famous and poignant statement of the importance of education is in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954), where Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Com­
pulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the per­
formance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. 
Id. at 493. In the context of the right to travel, courts have defended the importance of education in 
Lister, 706 F.2d at 798; Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 238; Markowitz, 2002 WL 3 142861 9  at *2; 
Gurfinkel, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 204; and Kirk, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 266. 
141. The author mentions these particular benefits because Shapiro's famous footnote stated 
that the denial of such benefits may not constitute penalties upon the exercise of the right to travel. 
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 6 18, 638 n.21 ( 1969). 
142. Cf Att'y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 908 ( 1986) ("The award of bonus 
points can mean the difference between winning or losing civil service employment . . . .  "). 
143. Id. 
1 44. A particular state university may also provide unique and valuable benefits compared to 
other options, as discussed supra note 94. 
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D .  Consequences for Sturgis and Starns 
A principal contention against use of strict scrutiny for in-state tuition 
could be the Supreme Court's summary affirmations of Starns and Sturgis. 
As discussed earlier, those district courts upheld durational-residence re­
quirements for in-state tuition under rational basis review. 145 In deciding 
Saenz, the Court never disapproved or overruled these cases. In fact, the 
Court may have implicitly reaffirmed them through its fashioning of the 
portability distinction, which it supported by citation to Vlandis's dicta con­
cerning waiting periods for in-state tuition. 146 
Nonetheless, Starns and Sturgis cannot stand as principled decisions in 
light of the reasoning behind Saenz. The Court issued no opinion in either 
case, leaving only the district court opinions as windows to its thought proc­
esses. The district courts distinguished Shapiro and its call for strict scrutiny 
on the grounds that (1) they did not think that the requirements were created 
with the purpose or effect of deterring out-of-state students from attending 
in-state universities, and (2) the requirements did not deny the students the 
basic necessities of life. 147 On the second prong, although the Starns court 
"fully recognize[d] the value of higher education, [it could not] equate its 
attainment with food, clothing and shelter."148 The courts thus used Shapiro's 
severe-penalties rule and ultimately concluded that there was no penalty 
upon the exercise of the right to travel warranting heightened scrutiny. 149 
These lower court decisions are no longer valid. The reasoning of these 
opinions, which relies upon Shapiro's severe-penalties rule, is plainly incon­
sistent with the nondiscrimination rule established by Saenz. 150 Moreover, 
the portability distinction is a fiction that cannot shield in-state tuition from 
Saenz's new rule. 15 1  
145.  See supra text accompanying notes 37-49. 
146. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999) (citing Vlandis v. Kline, 4 1 2  U.S. 44 1 
(1973)). 
147. See Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 40-41 (W.D. Wash. 1973); Starns v. Malk­
erson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 237-38 (D. Minn. 1970). One can certainly criticize the first distinction in 
light of Blumstein, which concluded that Shapiro did not rest upon any finding of actual deterrence 
of travel. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340 (1972). The second distinction is more troublesome, 
but it is no longer applicable in light of Saenz, as discussed in supra Section II.C. 
1 48. Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 238. 
149. See id. 
1 50. As discussed in the supra text accompanying note 147, the courts' decisions were predi­
cated upon conclusions that the denials neither deterred interstate travel nor involved basic 
necessities of life. See supra Sections II.A and II. C for a discussion of why Saenz requires neither 
for strict scrutiny to apply. 
1 5 1 .  See supra Part I. 
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When one reviews in-state tuition durational-residence requirements under 
strict scrutiny, their unconstitutionality is quickly revealed. In order to survive 
strict scrutiny, the requirement must be narrowly tailored to advance a compel­
ling state interest. 152 States commonly claim that these requirements are 
necessary to achieve partial cost equalization between new and old residents, 1 53 
facilitate residency determinations, 154 and limit reduced tuition to those likely to 
make future contributions to the state's economy.1 55 The justifications that have 
been or are likely to be advanced for these requirements either are not compel­
ling or use means not narrowly tailored to achieve them.1 56 
The justification that the requirement is necessary to achieve partial cost 
equalization is not compelling. The basis of this justification is that states 
may collect lower tuition from those who have made recent contributions to 
the state or have recently spent money in the state for a brief period before 
enrolling in a state school.157 Thus, until a new resident makes some contri­
bution to the state's welfare, she is not entitled to the same privileges as 
longer term residents. A very similar justification failed scrutiny in Shapiro. 
Shapiro rejected distinctions between new and old residents based upon 
contributions they had made to the community in the form of taxes.158 The 
Court held the contribution justification constitutionally impermissible de­
spite the state's valid interest in maintaining its fiscal integrity.1 59 Under a 
contrary ruling, states would be able to apportion or deny benefits such as 
schools, parks, or police and fire protection based upon a citizen's past tax 
contributions. 160 The same constitutional objection applies to contributions 
made directly to the state economy since both involve benefits conferred to 
the local community. 
1 52. Saenz stated that the level of review was at least as strict as that in Shapiro, which re­
quired that the durational-residence requirement be "necessary to promote a compelling 
governmental interest." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 6 1 8, 634 ( 1969)). "Necessary" implies that less restrictive means are unavailable, therefore 
embracing the traditional "narrow tailoring" prong of strict scrutiny. 
1 53. States advanced this justification in Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 41 (W.D. 
Wash. 1 973); Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 240; Markowitz v. University of California, Hastings College 
of the Law, No. A0961 82, 2002 WL 3 1 428619, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2002); and Kirk v. 
Board of the Regents of the University of California, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (Ct. App. 1 969). 
1 54. Arizona advanced this justification in the context of nonemergency medical care in Me­
morial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415  U.S. 250, 267 (1974). 
1 55. California advanced this justification in Kirk, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 269. 
1 56. This Part does not exhaust all possible justifications that a state may offer. In general, 
however, durational-residence requirements for in-state tuition are unlikely to be narrowly tailored 
to meet any potentially compelling interest. 
1 57. See Sturgis, 368 F. Supp. at 4 1 ;  Starns, 326 F. Supp. at 240; Markowitz, 2002 WL 
3 1428619  at *3; Kirk, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 269. 
1 58. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 6 1 8, 632 (1969). 
1 59. Id. at 633. 
1 60. Id. at 632-33. 
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The justification that these durational-residence requirements are admin­
istratively convenient methods for determining residency also cannot 
withstand strict scrutiny. Maricopa County held that a durational-residence 
requirement is not narrowly tailored to this end because it is overinclusive. 161 
Overinclusiveness is apparent since one may become a bona fide resident of 
a state within any period of time after entering the state. 162 
These durational-residence requirements cannot be constitutionally 
permissible on the ground that they are the only way to determine residency 
and thus as narrowly tailored as practically feasible. 163 These requirements 
are not the only method of determining a person's residency status. Some 
colleges look to other indicators, avoiding a strict durational-residence re­
quirement. 164 Similarly, in determining one's residency for tax purposes, 
California lists thirteen factors-none of which involve the length of stay in 
the state-to determine residency and calls for comparing these factors 
across the different states to which a person has ties. 165 Many of these, such 
as location of social ties, family, and principal residence, apply to stu­
dents. 166 Accordingly, just as Shapiro concluded that other investigatory 
tools allowed states to determine a welfare applicant's residency status, 167 
state colleges and universities should have other means for evaluating a stu­
dent's residency status. With these identification tools, states need not worry 
that the constitutional requirements of the right to travel will threaten their 
ability to provide low-cost public education to their bona fide residents. 
1 6 1 .  Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 4 1 5  U.S. 250, 267 ( 1973). 
1 62. Eastman v. Univ. of Mich., 30 F.3d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1994). The requirement also could 
not be justified as a factor under Vlandis v. Kline, 412  U.S. 441 ,  452 ( 1972), since a strict one-year 
waiting period would be conclusive rather than just a factor. 
1 63. Chief Justice Rehnquist took this position in his dissent to Saenz, claiming that the dur­
ational-residence requirement served as an objective test of a resident's subjective intent to remain 
in the state. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 5 17 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Vlandis may 
have considered the administrative efficiency of such requirements in suggesting that it could be a 
factor in determining bona fide residence. See Vlandis, 4 1 2  U.S. at 452-53. 
1 64. The University of Cincinnati, for example, provides several ways of demonstrating a 
student's residency that do not require a one-year stay in the state. See OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR, 
UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, APPLICATION FOR CHANGE IN RESIDENCY CLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTION 
SHEET ( Feb. 1985), http://www.onestop.uc.edu/forms/info_change_residency.pdf . These include 
( I )  people who have full- or part-time employment in the state on a self-sustaining basis and are 
pursuing a part-time program at an institution of higher learning; and (2) dependent students whose 
parents, as of the first day of classes, have accepted full-time, self-sustaining employment and estab­
lished domicile in the state for reasons other than obtaining more favorable tuition rates. Id. 
1 65. FRANCHISE TAX Bo., STATE OF CALIF., FTB PvBLICATION 1 03 1 :  GUIDELINES FOR DE­
TERMINING RESIDENT STATUS-2004 (2004), available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/04_forms/ 
04_103 lpub.pdf. 
1 66. Of course, an income-tax payer has less incentive to establish residency than a student, 
reducing the likelihood that nonresidents will abuse the system. For instance, California taxes non­
residents only on income from California, whereas it taxes residents on all income regardless of its 
source. Id. at 4. Nevertheless, these provisions show that states can rely on other indicia to deter­
mine a person's residency. 
1 67. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636 (1969) ("[T]he welfare authorities investi­
gate the applicant's employment, housing, and family situation and in the course of the inquiry 
necessarily learn the facts upon which to determine whether the applicant is a resident."). 
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The justification that in-state tuition should be limited to those willing to 
make future contributions to the state economy should fail because a dur­
ational-residence requirement is not narrowly tailored to that end. This 
justification only makes sense when the waiting period is applied to non­
bona-fide residents; a bona fide resident would intend to remain in the state 
and make the desired future contributions. The requirement would thus lack 
even a rational basis if a state intentionally applied it to all new residents, 
bona fide or otherwise. 168 On the other hand, if this requirement were in­
tended to apply only to non-bona-fide residents, it would be overinclusive 
for reasons similar to a justification of administrative ease. 
Finally, even if Saenz can be read to establish a compelling state interest 
in restricting the apportionment of portable benefits, 169 a durational­
residence requirement would not be narrowly tailored to achieve that end. 
The concern surrounding the portability of a benefit is that a temporary resi­
dent will leave after acquirinF the benefit and enjoy it after returning to her 
previous state of residence. 17 The waiting period, however, would be both 
overinclusive and underinclusive. It would burden new bona fide residents 
who genuinely wish to take advantage of the benefit in their new state of 
residence; it would also fail to account for residents who have no intention 
of remaining in the state but have lived in the state for just a little longer 
than the requisite waiting period. Such a blunt tool cannot pass the rigors of 
strict scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
Saenz thus has implications far beyond what the Supreme Court likely 
envisioned. The Court's attempt to cabin the decision through the portability 
distinction cannot serve as a principled reason to limit the scope of its hold­
ing. Saenz's nondiscrimination rule flows over at least the broad range of 
state benefits that other case law has held significant enough to be protected 
by the fundamental right to travel. The similarity of in-state tuition to these 
other benefits, combined with the nondiscrimination rule, leads logically 
toward strict scrutiny review of these waiting periods. Much to the delight of 
traveling students, the states are unlikely to offer any justification that will 
pass constitutional muster under that standard. Saenz's broad impact can 
certainly spell trouble for other durational-residence requirements that have 
yet to be declared unconstitutional. 171 The decision truly ensures that once 
one decides to make a state her indefinite home, she may not be treated as a 
temporary interloper. States must account for this constitutional protection 
in fashioning their residency requirements. 
1 68. Cf Eastman v. Univ. of Mich., 30 F.3d 670, 673 (6th Cir. 1994). 
1 69. This possible reading is discussed in supra Section I.A. 
1 70. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1 999). 
1 7 1 .  Divorce i s  one possibility, see Sosna v. Iowa, 4 1 9  U.S. 393 (1975), despite any reluc­
tance by the Supreme Court to involve itself in family matters. See supra note 104. 
